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The State of Our Unions

The Social Health of Marriage in America

2004

Essay: The Marrying Kind: Which Men Marry and Why
 


Barbara Dafoe Whitehead

David Popenoe

© Copyright 2004


Including the annual index of

SOCIAL INDICATORS OF MARITAL HEALTH AND WELLBEING: TRENDS OF THE PAST FOUR DECADES

Marriage

Divorce

Unmarried Cohabitation

Loss of Child Centeredness

Fragile Families with Children

Teen Attitudes About Marriage and Family

Introduction to the State of Our Unions Series

In our first The State of Our Unions report, published in 1999, we stated: "we hear little about the state of marriage." How things have changed in the past six years! Today, we hear a great deal about marriage.

Marriage has appeared on the public agenda at both the federal and state levels. As part of its proposal for the reauthorization of welfare reform, the Bush administration is seeking $1.5 billion to provide access to marriage education, skills training and counseling resources for low-income couples who choose to marry. A handful of states, using flexible dollars from the 1996 welfare reform bill, are already experimenting with pilot programs to lower the divorce rate or to encourage "healthy marriages." On the legislative side, Congress has acted to eliminate the marriage penalty in federal income taxes and in the Earned Income Tax Credit. In recent months, Congressional committees have held hearings on marriage.

Marriage-strengthening initiatives are underway in local communities as well. Some communities are organizing coalitions to develop a common strategy for preparing couples for marriage and for mentoring them after marriage. A grassroots marriage "movement," dedicated to helping people acquire the knowledge and skills to form and sustain low-conflict, long-lasting marriages, is gaining adherents and momentum across the country. Professional educators, as well as community and faith leaders, are adopting new research-based approaches to teaching relationship and marriage skills. Still other local groups are developing community-based assets and resources to support married couples.

Most recently and most controversially, the issue of gay marriage has commanded public attention and debate. On May 17, 2004, following a 4-to-3 decision by the Massachusetts State Supreme Court, Massachusetts became the first state in the union to grant same-sex couples the rights and responsibilities of legal marriage. In opposition to the Massachusetts decision, President Bush has called for a constitutional amendment to ban same-sex marriage. In addition, 40 states have adopted laws preventing same-sex couples from marrying.

Marriage has also gained new prominence on the research agenda. After several decades of neglect of the subject, scholars are expressing renewed interest in studying marriage and marriage policy. In part, their interest is triggered by the Administration proposals to strengthen marriage. Several research initiatives have been launched to study or evaluate the impact of marriage programs on family formation among low-income couples. But in larger part, the renewed research interest in marriage is inspired by the recognition that we are in the midst of a period of revolutionary change in the institution of marriage. As we have noted in previous The State of Our Unions reports, the pathway into marriage is changing. The meaning of marriage is changing. The institutional role of marriage is changing. Today, marriage is popular again but it is popular for reasons that are quite different from the reasons that prompted people to marry in the past.

As the first university-based initiative devoted exclusively to the study of contemporary marriage, the National Marriage Project is committed to providing research and analysis on the state of marriage and marital relationships in America. Our annual report, The State of Our Unions, provides a summary of key marriage-related trends. This year, as in previous years, the publication is divided into two sections. The first section, an essay on marriage attitudes and behavior among today’s young men, reports on the findings of a new nationally representative survey of young men commissioned by the National Marriage Project and conducted by Opinion Research Corporation in February 2004.

The second section includes what we consider the most important annually or biennially updated indicators related to marriage, divorce, unmarried cohabitation, child-centeredness, fragile families with children and teen attitudes about marriage and family. In addition, this section includes a brief discussion of three new topics: What is Happening to Childrearing Families?; Your Chances of Divorce May be Much Lower Than You Think; and The Surprising Economic Benefits of Marriage. For this section, we have used the latest and most reliable data available. We cover the period from 1960 to the present, so these data reflect historical trends over several decades. Most of the data come from the United States Bureau of the Census. All of the data are collected by long established and scientifically reputable institutions.

David Popenoe

Barbara Dafoe Whitehead


Executive Summary

The Marrying Kind: Which Men Marry and Why

Challenging the popular stereotype of the marriagephobic male, findings from a new national survey of young heterosexual men, ages 25-34, indicate that while men are delaying marriage until older ages, most men are "the marrying kind." Among all men surveyed, those from traditional, religiously observant family backgrounds are more likely to be married, to seek marriage and to have positive views of marriage, women, and children than young males from nontraditional and nonreligously observant family backgrounds. Among the unmarried men surveyed, however, there is a small but significant subset of men who are personally averse to marriage. Slightly more than two out of ten expressed strongly negative views about their own personal desire to marry as well as more negative attitudes toward marriage, women, and children. Compared to other unmarried men in the survey sample, they are significantly more likely to come from nontraditional and nonreligiously observant families.

Social Indicators of Marital Health and Wellbeing:

Our social indicators are based on decadal measures which are more reliable than year-by-year changes. This year, the social indicators remain about the same as last year. Overall, these decadal trends continue to reflect declines in marital health and wellbeing. The most noteworthy changes this year are the continuing decline of the marriage rate accompanied by an increase in the number of cohabiting couples; a small increase in the percentage of children living in fragile families and born out of wedlock; and a sharp increase among teenage boys in their acceptance of unwed childbearing and a slight decrease in agreement among teenagers, especially girls, that "living together before getting married is a good idea."


 

The Marrying Kind: Which Men Marry and Why

by Barbara Dafoe Whitehead and David Popenoe

Today’s best-selling novels, movies, television shows and self-help books are obsessed with the thirty-something single man and his romantic pursuits. But today’s bachelor hero is different from romantic heroes of the past. The old heroes were the courting and marrying kind. The new heroes are the fleeing and non-marrying kind. Instead of Cary Grant and Jimmy Stewart, we now have Mr. Big and the Big Lebowsky. Even in ABC’s hit reality show The Bachelor, where the mission is marriage, four out of the five bachelors have broken up with the woman they picked as their future bride. As for the fifth and most recent bachelor, his marital match is already prompting tabloid speculation: Is It Over Between Jesse and Jessica?

Likewise, recent social science research into men’s marrying behavior tends to focus on those men who are least likely to marry. Some researchers have been interested in exploring the recent and steep decline in African-American men’s marriage rates. Others have focused on identifying the obstacles to marriage among low-income men. Still others have turned their attention to the study of cohabiting men and unwed fathers.

What about the young men who are married? Neither the popular culture nor the research community has paid them much mind in recent decades. Indeed, the young husband has virtually disappeared as a cultural figure or a social type. Yet married men represent an important segment of the young male population. In 2002, there were 9.5 million married men between the ages of 25 and 34. And contrary to the popular stereotype, the typical thirty-something guy is a married guy.

Besides demography, there’s still another reason to pay closer attention to young married men. The popular image of the young male as a rolling stone or a slacker drone is now widespread. Though there is some basis for this stereotype – a point we will return to later in this essay, it hardly describes the behavior of most young men. Knowing something about the characteristics and marrying behavior of young married men can help correct this skewed image.

Further, such knowledge can also shed light on which men are likely to marry and which are not. In the past, for most young heterosexual adults, the marriage market and the partner market were virtually identical. Today, that is no longer the case. The marriage market is only part of a larger and more diverse partner market. Not every young male who is actively seeking a partner is searching for a wife. Some are looking for a sex partner. Others are looking for a "relationship" but not necessarily marriage. Nor do young males have identical fertility, marital or relationship histories. Some have children. Others do not. Some are divorced or separated. Others have not yet married for the first time. Some are cohabiting but still looking for their true "soul mate." Others have never lived with a romantic partner. Such diversity in the goals and background of men in the partner market can make marital matching more difficult, prolonged, confusing and potentially less successful for both men and women, but especially for marriage-minded women. Consequently, it is helpful to know as much as possible about the characteristics of men who are likely to marry.

In this year’s report, therefore, we take a look at men who are the "marrying kind," and some who aren’t. We identify the "marrying kind" as young men who are currently married and young unmarried men who say that they are ready to marry. Our portrait is based on the results of a nationally representative survey of more than1,000 (1,010) heterosexual young men, ages 25 to 34, commissioned by the National Marriage Project and conducted by the Opinion Research Corporation in February 2004. More than half of the sample is made up of married men (569), most in their first marriage. The rest of the sample (441) consists of unmarried men, most of whom have not yet married for the first time. Most of our sample is beyond the median age of first marriage for men, which is close to 27, so the singles represent a group that is delaying or in some cases avoiding marriage.

In this survey, we set out to ask two related sets of questions. First: What are the characteristics of the married men in the sample? Why do they get married when they do? How, in their opinion, has marriage changed their lives? Second: Among the unmarried men in the sample, how do single men gauge their personal readiness to marry? How, if at all, do the characteristics of the marriage-minded single men differ from those who are less likely, or ready, to marry?

In addition to seeking answers to these questions, we also explored men’s attitudes about marriage, divorce, children, family life and the role of government in marriage.

Before turning to the findings of the survey, however, it is important to understand the role of marriage in men’s lives.

Marriage in Men’s Lives

For men, even more than for women, marriage is a transformative event. Getting married tends to change men’s behavior in notable and predictable ways. When men marry, they begin to lead healthier and more productive lives. They work harder and do better financially than men who are not married. They are less likely to hang out in bars, to abuse alcohol or drugs or to engage in illegal activities. They are more likely to spend time with relatives and to be involved in religious and community activities. Their sex lives are better. They are more responsible and involved fathers.1

Scholars offer a number of explanations for the positive effects of marriage on men. One key reason is wives. Married women provide emotional support and physical care to their spouses. They monitor their husband’s health habits, encourage them to seek medical treatment, when necessary, and often find a doctor or health professional to provide such treatment. In addition to TLC, wives commonly provide SDRs (stable domestic routines). Along with better health practices, stable routines help to reduce job absenteeism, quit rates and sick days and thus to strengthen men’s workforce attachment. Moreover, since the majority of married women today work outside the home, including over half of wives with young children, men gain financial advantages from their wives’ workforce participation. Wage-earning wives reduce pressure on husbands to be the sole breadwinner while, at the same time, increasing family income and assets, the traditional measure of a husband’s contribution to the family.

But the positive influence of wives does not explain why married men do better than, say, cohabiting men who also enjoy the benefits of having a female domestic partner. The reason for the difference probably has to do with the influence of marriage itself. Marriage includes a norm of male altruism. While it is acceptable for single men to be self-indulgent and carefree, it is not so for married men. Once married, men are supposed work and care for others. They are expected to voluntarily donate their time and money to their wives and children and also, to a lesser degree, to kin who may need their help.

Marriage carries a norm and expectation of permanence. Even in our high-divorce society, people still believe that marriage should last a long time, if not always a lifetime. This norm encourages a change in outlook, from a short-term, high-risk, "live for the moment" orientation to one that is more oriented to the future and to the future well-being of the family. Thus, married men tend to save more and work harder because they are thinking ahead to future responsibilities, such as educating their children or buying a house.

Finally, as sociologist Steven Nock argues, marriage establishes norms of adult heterosexual masculinity.2 In their sexual behavior, single men are viewed as juveniles: they are still "playing," as the words "playboy," "player," "boytoy," and even "boyfriend" suggest. Of course, the cultural distinction between single "boys" and married men is not a measure of individual men’s maturity level. Rather, it reflects the influence of the institution of marriage on norms of male behavior. Marriage sets forth norms of masculinity that stand in sharp contrast to norms for teenage boys. For one thing, marital norms require men to be sexually faithful, to choose one woman above all others and to find in her the fulfillment of their sexual desires. For another, marital norms of masculinity call for accountability, sacrifice, and commitment rather than sensation-seeking, risk-taking, and unfettered freedom. Finally, marital norms require men to attach themselves to the mother of their children and to share in the long-term task of rearing their offspring. Married men have to commit to social, as well as biological, fatherhood. By instituting these norms of masculine behavior, marriage helps turn boys into men.

The Marrying Kind

  • Married Men: Background characteristics

Men who grew up with both biological parents, whose father was involved in their lives, and whose parents attended religious services regularly are more likely to be represented among the population of men who are currently married. Sixty-three percent of all marrieds were living with both of their biological parents at age fifteen, for example, compared to 55 percent of the unmarrieds. Thus the married men tend to come from more traditional family backgrounds.

  • Timing of marriage

A large majority (81 percent) of married men agree with the statement that "you decided to marry because it was the right time in your life to settle down." Contrary to some popular opinion, the majority of married men surveyed do not believe that they decided to marry under pressure or duress from their future wives. Only 15 percent agree with the statement "you got married sooner than you wanted because your wife was pushing for it." Of course, this finding does not tell us whether or not pressure was actually exerted. What it does suggest is that most married young men see their decision to wed as a choice and commitment they make freely and for their own reasons.

Among married men, readiness to have children does not figure prominently in their decision to marry. Only 35 percent agree that "you got married because you were ready to have children." Nonetheless, when currently married men were looking for a spouse, the majority apparently figured on having children sometime in the future. Seventy-five percent agree that in choosing a wife, they specifically looked for someone who would be a good mother.

  • Religious Behavior

Not surprisingly, the married men are more religiously active than the unmarrieds. Nearly half say that they go to religious services several times a month, versus less than a quarter of the unmarrieds. Compared to unmarried men, they are also significantly more likely to agree that "children should be raised in a religion" (75 percent v. 59 percent).

  • Satisfaction with marriage

The overwhelming majority of married men (94 percent) say that they are happier being married than being single. A large majority agree that marriage has improved their lives in two domains that are important to men: namely, sex and money. Seventy-three percent say that their sex life is better since getting married, and 68 percent say that marriage has helped them become more financially stable. Also, compared to unmarried men, married men are more optimistic about the institution itself. Less than half of married men (42 percent) agree with the statement "there are so many bad marriages today, it makes one question the value of marriage" compared to 58 percent of unmarried men.

  • Children

Most married men do not see children as the central purpose of marriage. In this respect, their opinion is virtually identical to unmarried men. Slightly more than two-thirds of all men disagree with the statement that "the main purpose of marriage is to have children."

However, 70 percent of married men surveyed live in households with children and, not surprisingly, they hold more child-centered attitudes than unmarried men. For example, married men are more likely to agree that "watching children grow up is life’s greatest joy" and they would feel as if they had "missed out on something important in life" if they did not have kids of their own. They are also more likely to want more than one child.

Married men are more disapproving of unwed childbearing. Less than half (47 percent) of married men agree with the view that "it’s okay for a woman to have a child on her own if she can afford it" compared to 63 percent of unmarried men. Also, they are more likely than unmarried men to say that "people should marry and not just live together if they have children" (64 percent v. 53 percent).

 Single Men: Who’s "the marrying kind?"

As demographers tell us, men are delaying marriage until older ages. As recently as 1970, the median age of first marriage for men was 23; today it is approaching 27. For college educated men, the median age of first marriage is estimated to be a year or two older.

Scholars commonly point to two key factors in male delay of marriage: longer years of education and greater difficulties in gaining a secure foothold on the job ladder. But education and employment are not the only factors involved in this recent phenomenon.

One new factor is the changing place of marriage in the transition to adulthood. Marriage is becoming one of the later transitions in the early adult life course rather than one of the earlier. According to a recent study of findings from the General Social Survey, people now place marriage after finishing schooling, obtaining full-time employment, and being financially independent in the sequence of events associated with the transition to adulthood. Overall, people believe that the "right" age to marry is around 25, with college-educated people favoring marriage at about 27.3 However, strict "age-of-marriage" norms are weakening. Young men encounter few social or familial pressures to marry by a certain age as a sign of their majority or maturity. Nor are they subject to the stern sanctions of shot-gun marriage should they father a child outside of wedlock. And finally, young men face few, if any, negative consequences to delaying marriage. On the contrary, they have attractive alternatives to marriage. They have access to a singles culture that caters to young males. They can live with a young woman and gain some of the sexual and domestic benefits of marriage without the long-term commitment of marriage. Or they can simply enjoy the freedom of being unattached and uncommitted.

  • Unmarried But "Ready to Marry Tomorrow"

For unmarried men, as for married men, the experience of growing up with both biological parents is associated with the desire and propensity to marry. More than half —54 percent of singles from biofamilies—agree with the statement "you’d be ready to marry tomorrow if the right person came along" compared to 43 percent of those from other kinds of family backgrounds. Men who say that their fathers were very involved in their upbringing are also more "ready" than men who say their fathers were not very involved. (53 percent v. 38 percent). Further, unmarried guys from intact families have more positive attitudes toward women. Sixty percent of men from bioparent families disagree with the statement "you can’t trust women to tell the truth about their past relationships, compared to just 47 percent of men from other family backgrounds.

Unmarried men who attend religious services several times per month or more are also likely to agree that they would be ready to get married tomorrow than nonobservant men (55 percent v. 43 percent) Religiously observant men also hold the most pro-family attitudes.

Cohabitation experiences play a growing role in the marriage attitudes of today’s unmarried men. Men who have had only one living together relationship or are currently in their first living together relationship are more likely to agree that "your most important personal goal is getting married" compared to men with no living together experience or those with more than one cohabitation experience. This view probably reflects the normative role that cohabitation now plays as a stepping-stone into marriage. Half of marriages today are preceded by cohabiting unions.

  • Unmarried But Ready to Marry . . . Someday?

Fifty-three percent of the unmarried men in our sample agree that they are "not interested in getting married anytime soon." As for their reasons for postponing marriage, nearly three-fourths (74 percent) agree with the statement "at this stage in my life I want fun and freedom." In addition to "fun and freedom," men cite a number of other reasons for putting off marriage, including: the challenges of the marital search itself; the time constraints on dating imposed by work obligations; and the need to achieve financial viability, or the proxies of financial viability, such as a house or nice wedding. For example, 46 percent agree with the statement: "your work schedule makes it difficult for you to go out and date;" 47 percent agree that "you wouldn’t want to marry until you could afford to own a home;" and 40 percent agree that "you wouldn’t want to marry until you could afford a nice wedding." Interestingly, most single men are not putting off marriage in order to have more satisfying sex lives. Only 36 percent agree that "single men have better sex lives than married men."

Single Men: Who’s The Nonmarrying Kind?

A small but significant subset of our sample of unmarried men, some 98, or 22 percent of the total, agreed with the statement that "marriage is good for some people but personally it is not for you." We consider this group to be relatively hardcore marriage avoiders, and it is useful to look at how they differ from the rest of the young unmarried male population.

Compared to the rest of unmarried men in this sample, those who say that marriage is "personally not for you" are strikingly more averse to marriage on a number of key questions. For example, they are substantially more likely to mistrust women to tell the truth about past relationships (60 percent v. 39 percent); more likely to worry about the risks of divorce (66 percent v. 53 percent); more likely to believe that it is okay for a woman to have a child on her own (70 percent v. 61 percent); more likely to say that they do not want children (29 percent v. 6 percent); more likely to say that single men have better sex lives than married men (52 percent v. 31 percent) and more likely to agree that "if you marry, your biggest concern would be losing your personal freedom" (62 percent v. 30 percent). They are also less likely than other unmarried men to have grown up in traditional families (41 percent v. 58 percent) and less likely to have had fathers who were involved in their lives (58 percent v. 75 percent).

Age is yet another important predictor of men’s propensity to marry. Most men will have married for the first time by age 30. Given that fact, one might expect that the men, ages 30 to 34, in this survey sample would be among those unmarried men most ready to commit to marriage. However, a relatively high percentage of these thirtysomething men are ambivalent or averse to marrying anytime soon. For example, 68 percent say that at this stage in life they want fun and freedom; 54 percent say they are not interested in getting married anytime soon; 64 percent agree "there are so many bad marriages today it makes one question the value of marriage;" and 41 percent agree that "you can’t trust women to tell the truth about their past relationships." Only 24 percent agree that "your most important personal goal is to get married."

Discussion

What kind of men are the marrying kind? The findings of this national survey suggest that young men from more traditional backgrounds are significantly more likely to marry and to have positive views of marriage and family life than men from nontraditional backgrounds. Men who grow up with both biological parents in the household are more likely to be married than men who grow up in other kinds of family households. Conversely, among unmarried men, experiencing a nontraditional family structure in childhood is associated with greater ambivalence about marriage and greater propensity to delay marriage.4

A strong religious upbringing is another factor influencing men’s greater propensity to marry. Men who are reared by religiously observant parents and who are religiously observant themselves are more likely to be married and to have positive views of marriage and family life than men who have not had have religious upbringings and do not regularly attend religious services themselves.

Still, among all young men today, there have been a number of important changes in marrying attitudes and behavior. One such change is the delay of entry into marriage. The prime time for men to search for and marry their "soul mate" now occurs at a later point in the early adult life course, roughly during the years between ages 25 and 30. In addition to the later timing of marriage, the meaning of marriage has changed. Compared to earlier generations of men, young men today are less likely to equate marriage with becoming an adult. Nor do they regard marriage as closely connected to "building a family." Indeed, for the majority of male respondents in this survey, children are not an important reason for marriage. Thus, though marriage remains an important transitional event in men’s lives, it is increasingly disconnected from traditional notions of male adulthood or aspirations to fatherhood.

Another factor affecting men’s marrying behavior is the existence of attractive alternatives to marriage. Contemporary urban singles life provides many social outlets and sexual opportunities for unmarried males. Young men face little social disapproval of prolonged bachelorhood from their peers, parents, or employers. And in the consumer culture, men are encouraged to indulge themselves in their bachelorhood. Cohabitation is another recent factor influencing men’s propensity to marry. For some men, especially those over 30, cohabitation offers an appealing alternative to marriage as well as to bachelorhood. This is especially true for older male urbanites.5

Also, and most notably, men face few penalties for postponing marriage until older ages. Unlike peer women over thirty, they do not have to worry about a ticking biological clock. Nor do they have to obey a sociological "clock." Compared to earlier times, social pressures to marry are weak, even when young men father children out-of-wedlock. Men are more likely to time their entry into marriage according to a set of personal calculations rather than to a set of social expectations. As a huge majority of the married men in our sample stated, they decided to marry because it was "the right time in life to settle down."

Lastly, men are seeking a "soul-mate" relationship. According to a 2002 Gallup survey commissioned by the National Marriage Project, the vast majority of young men are looking for a soul mate who will fulfill their emotional, sexual, and spiritual desires and who will also share breadwinning responsibilities. More traditional aspirations – such as finding a wife who will stay home and care for children or who shares a similar religious faith or ethnic background – have receded in importance. However, as we have noted in earlier The State of Our Unions reports, the soul-mate ideal itself may contribute to the delay in marriage. Men who are searching for the perfect soul mate may be less satisfied with their real-life romantic partners. Even when they are satisfied with their current girlfriend, they may believe that they will find a "better one" out there if they just wait a bit longer. Further, a pornographic media culture may contribute to unrealistic expectations of what their future soul mate should look like. Influenced by the sexy images of young women on MTV, the Internet and on the runway in televised Victoria’s Secret specials, men may be putting off marriage to their current girlfriend in the hopes that they will eventually find a combination "soul mate/babe."

To conclude, the findings of this national survey support the view that, while there are many reasons why marriage today is being postponed, most young men are still "the marrying kind." Moreover, the men who are the best "marriage bets" are those who are more traditional in their family and religious background characteristics and in their attitudes toward marriage. However, a small but significant percentage of men might be considered poor "marriage bets." Slightly more than two out of ten unmarried men who responded to this survey hold substantially more negative attitudes about their own personal propensity to marry as well as more negative attitudes toward marriage, women and children. And they are far more likely to come from nontraditional and nonreligious backgrounds. No doubt, it is the presence of these men in the partner market that has led to the popular media stereotype of the commitmentphobic young male on the make but not on the path to marriage.

 Endnotes

1  See summaries of the evidence in:  Linda J. Waite and Maggie Gallagher, The Case For Marriage (NY: Doubleday, 2000) and David Popenoe, Life Without Father (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999).

2  Steven L. Nock, Marriage in Men’s Lives (NY: Oxford University Press, 1998), 56-57

3  Tom W. Smith, “Coming of Age in 21st Century America: Public Attitudes Towards the Importance and Timing of Transitions to Adulthood,” National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago, GSS Topical Report 35, 2003, 1-14.

4  Men from disrupted families are likely to experience economic strain during their childhood and thus may have heightened concerns about the economic risks that marriage poses in a high-divorce society.  They may have gained more negative views of marriage from their divorced parents.  Absent positive models of marriage, they may have less confidence about their own ability to sustain a long-lasting and satisfying marriage.  

5  Sharon Sassler and Frances Goldscheider, “Revisiting Jane Austen’s Theory of Marriage Timing: Changes in Union Formation Among American Men in the Late 20th Century,” Journal of Family Issues 25: 2, March 2004 139-166.


SOCIAL INDICATORS OF MARITAL HEALTH AND WELLBEING

TRENDS OF THE PAST FOUR DECADES

Marriage

Divorce

Unmarried Cohabitation

Loss of Child Centeredness

Fragile Families with Children

Teen Attitudes About Marriage and Family

MARRIAGE

Key Finding: Marriage trends in recent decades indicate that Americans have become less likely to marry, and the most recent data show that the marriage rate in the United States continues to decline. Of those who do marry, there has been a moderate drop since the 1970s in the percentage of couples who consider their marriages to be "very happy," but in the past decade this trend has swung in a positive direction.

Americans have become less likely to marry. This is reflected in a decline of more than 40 percent, from 1970 to 2002, in the annual number of marriages per 1000 unmarried adult women (Figure 1). Some of this decline—it is not clear just how much—results from the delaying of first marriages until older ages: the median age at first marriage went from 20 for females and 23 for males in 1960 to about 25 and 27, respectively, in recent years. Other factors accounting for the decline are the growth of unmarried cohabitation and a small decrease in the tendency of divorced persons to remarry.

The decline also reflects some increase in lifelong singlehood, though the actual amount can not be known until current young and middle-aged adults pass through the life course.

The percentage of adults in the population who are married has also diminished. Since 1960, the decline of those married among all persons age 15 and older has been twelve percentage points—and over 23 points among black females (Figure 2). It should be noted that these data include both people who have never married and those who have married and then divorced. (For some economic implications of the decline of marriage, see the accompanying box: "The Surprising Economic Benefits of Marriage.")

In order partially to control for a decline in married adults simply due to delayed first marriages, we have looked at changes in the percentage of persons age 35 through 44 who were married (Figure 3). Since 1960, there has been a drop of almost 19 percentage points for married men and over 16 points for married women. A slight increase in the percentage of married people in this age group occurred beginning in 1999, for unknown reasons, but this increase now appears to have ended.

Marriage trends in the age range of 35 to 44 are suggestive of lifelong singlehood. In times past and still today, virtually all persons who were going to marry during their lifetimes had married by age 45. More than 90 percent of women have married eventually in every generation for which records exist, going back to the mid-1800s. By 1960, 94 percent of women then alive had been married at least once by age 45—probably an historical high point. (1) For the generation of 1995, assuming a continuation of then current marriage rates, several demographers projected that 88 percent of women and 82 percent of men would ever marry. (2) If and when these figures are recalculated for the early years of the 21st century, the percentage of women and men ever marrying will almost certainly be lower.

It is important to note that the decline in marriage does not mean that people are giving up on living together with a sexual partner. On the contrary, with the incidence of unmarried cohabitation increasing rapidly, marriage is giving ground to unwed unions. Most people now live together before they marry for the first time. An even higher percentage of those divorced who subsequently remarry live together first. And a growing number of persons, both young and old, are living together with no plans for eventual marriage.

There is a common belief that, although a smaller percentage of Americans are now marrying than was the case a few decades ago, those who marry have marriages of higher quality. It seems reasonable that if divorce removes poor marriages from the pool of married couples and cohabitation "trial marriages" deter some bad marriages from forming, the remaining marriages on average should be happier. The best available evidence on the topic, however, does not support these assumptions. Since 1973, the General Social Survey periodically has asked representative samples of married Americans to rate their marriages as either "very happy," "pretty happy," or "not too happy."(3) As Figure 4 indicates, the percentage of both men and women saying "very happy" has declined moderately over the past 25 years.(4) This trend has shown a turnaround since reaching a low point in 1994, however, and is now heading in a positive direction.

 
1 Andrew J. Cherlin, Marriage, Divorce, and Remarriage (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992): 10; Michael R. Haines, "Long-Term Marriage Patterns in the United States from Colonial Times to the Present," The History of the Family 1-1 (1996): 15-39

2 Robert Schoen and Nicola Standish, "The Retrenchment of Marriage: Results from Marital Status Life Tables for the United States, 1995." Population and Development Review 27-3 (2001): 553-563.

3 Conducted by the National Opinion Research Center of the University of Chicago, this is a nationally representative study of the English-speaking, non-institutionalized population of the United States age 18 and over.

4 Using a different data set that compared marriages in 1980 with marriages in 1992, equated in terms of marital duration, Stacy J. Rogers and Paul Amato found similarly that the 1992 marriages had less marital interaction, more marital conflict, and more marital problems. "Is Marital Quality Declining? The Evidence from Two Generations," Social Forces 75 (1997): 1089

BOX 1: THE SURPRISING ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF MARRIAGE

When thinking of the many benefits of marriage, the economic aspects are often overlooked. Yet the economic benefits of marriage are substantial, both for individuals and for society as a whole. Marriage is a wealth generating institution. Married couples create more economic assets on average than do otherwise similar singles or cohabiting couples. A 1992 study of retirement data concluded that "individuals who are not continuously married have significantly lower wealth than those who remain married throughout their lives." Compared to those continuously married, those who never married have a reduction in wealth of 75% and those who divorced and didn’t remarry have a reduction of 73%.a

One might think that the explanation for why marriage generates economic assets is because those people who are more likely to be wealth creators are also more likely to marry and stay married. And this is certainly true, but only in part. The institution of marriage itself provides a wealth-generation bonus. It does this through providing economies of scale (two can live more cheaply than one), and as implicitly a long-term personal contract it encourages economic specialization. Working as a couple, individuals can develop those skills in which they excel, leaving others to their partner.

Also, married couples save and invest more for the future, and they can act as a small insurance pool against life uncertainties such as illness and job loss.b Probably because of marital social norms that encourage healthy, productive behavior, men tend to become more economically productive after marriage; they earn between 10 and 40 percent more than do single men with similar education and job histories.c All of these benefits are independent of the fact that married couples receive more work-related and government-provided support, and also more help and support from their extended families (two sets of in-laws) and friends.d

Beyond the economic advantages of marriage for the married couples themselves, marriage has a tremendous economic impact on society. It is a major contributor to family income levels and inequality. After more than doubling between 1947 and 1977, the growth of median family income has slowed over the past 20 years, increasing by just 9.6%. A big reason is that married couples, who fare better economically than their single counterparts, have been a rapidly decreasing proportion of total families. In this same 20 year period, and largely because of changes in family structure, family income inequality has increased significantly.e

Research has shown consistently that both divorce and unmarried childbearing increase child poverty. In recent years the majority of children who grow up outside of married families have experienced at least one year of dire poverty.f According to one study, if family structure had not changed between 1960 and 1998, the black child poverty rate in 1998 would have been 28.4% rather than 45.6%, and the white child poverty rate would have been 11.4% rather than 15.4%.g The rise in child poverty, of course, generates significant public costs in health and welfare programs.

Marriages that end in divorce also are very costly to the public. One researcher determined that a single divorce costs state and federal governments about $30,000, based on such things as the higher use of food stamps and public housing as well as increased bankruptcies and juvenile delinquency. The nation’s 10.4 million divorces in 2002 are estimated to have cost the taxpayers more than $30 billion.h

 

a Janet Wilmoth and Gregor Koso, “Does Marital History Matter? Marital Status and Wealth Outcomes Among Preretirement Adults,” Journal of Marriage and the Family 64:254-68, 2002.

b Thomas A. Hirschl, Joyce Altobelli, and Mark R. Rank, “Does Marriage Increase the Odds of Affluence? Exploring the Life Course Probabilities,” Journal of Marriage and the Family 65-4 (2003): 927-938;    Joseph Lupton and James P. Smith, “Marriage, Assets and Savings,” in Shoshana A. Grossbard-Schectman (ed.) Marriage and the Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003): 129-152.

c Jeffrey S. Gray and Michael J. Vanderhart, “The Determination of Wages: Does Marriage Matter?,” in Linda Waite, et. al. (eds.) The Ties that Bind: Perspectives on Marriage and Cohabitation (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 2000): 356-367;  S. Korenman and D. Neumark, “Does Marriage Really Make Men More Productive?” Journal of Human Resources 26-2 (1991): 282-307;  K. Daniel, “The Marriage Premium,” in M. Tomassi and K Ierulli (eds.) The New Economics of Human Behavior (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) 113-125.

d Lingxin Hao, “Family Structure, Private Transfers, and the Economic Well-Being of Families with Children,” Social Forces 75 (1996): 269-292.

e U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, P60-203, Measuring 50 Years of Economic Change Using the March Current Population Survey, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1998; John Iceland, “Why Poverty Remains High: The Role of Income Growth, Economic Inequality, and Changes in Family Structure, 1949-1999,” Demography 40-3:499-519, 2003.

f Mark R. Rank and Thomas A. Hirschl, “The Economic Risk of Childhood in America: Estimating the Probability of Poverty Across the Formative Years,” Journal of Marriage and the Family 61:1058-1067, 1999.

g Adam Thomas and Isabel Sawhill, “For Richer or For Poorer: Marriage as an Antipoverty Strategy,” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 21:4, 2002.

h David Schramm, “The Costly Consequences of Divorce in Utah: The Impact on Couples, Community, and Government,” Logan, UT: Utah State University, 2003. Unpublished preliminary report.


Figure 1. Number of Marriages per 

1,000 Unmarried Women Age 15 and 

Older, by Year, United States a

Year Number
1960 73.5b
1970 76.5
1975 66.9
1980 61.4
1985 56.2
1990 54.5
1995 50.8
2000 46.5
2002 43.4*
a We have used the number of marriages per 1,000 unmarried women age 15 and older, rather than the Crude Marriage Rate of marriages per 1,000 population to help avoid the problem of compositional changes in the population, that is, changes which stem merely from there being more or less people in the marriageable ages. Even this more refined measure is somewhat susceptible to compositional changes.
b Per 1,000 unmarried women age 14 and older
Source: US Department of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 2001, Page 87, Table 117; and Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1986, Page 79, Table 124.
*Figure for 2002 was obtained using data from the Current Population Surveys, March 2002 Supplement, as well as Births, Marriages, Divorces, and Deaths: Provisional Data for October-December 2002, National Vital Statistics Report 51:10, June 17, 2003, Table 3. (www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/pdf/51_10_12_t03.pdf) The CPS, March Supplement, is based on a sample of the US population, rather than an actual count such as those available from the decennial census. See sampling and weighting notes at http://www.bls.census.gov:80/cps/ads/2002/ssampwgt.htm

Figure 2. Percentage of All Persons Age 15 and Older Who Were Married, by Sex and Race, 1960-2003 United Statesa
Total Males Black Males White Males Total Females Black Females White Females
1960 69.3 60.9 70.2 65.9 59.8 66.6
1970 66.7 56.9 68 61.9 54.1 62.8
1980 63.2 48.8 65 58.9 44.6 60.7
1990 60.7 45.1 62.8 56.9 40.2 59.1
2000 57.9 42.8 60 54.7 36.2 57.4

2003b

57.1 42.5 59.3 54 36.4 56.6
a Includes races other than Black and White.
b In 2003, the US Census Bureau expanded its racial categories to permit respondents to identify themselves as belonging to more than one race. This means that racial data computations begining in 2003 may not be strictly comparable to those of prior years.
Source: U. S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Series P20-506; America's Families and Living Arrangements: March 2000 and earlier reports; internet tables (www.census.gov/population/socdemo/hh-fam/tabMS-1.pdf); and data calculated from the Current Population Surveys, March 2003 Supplement.

 

Figure 3. Percentage of Persons Age 35 through 44 Who Were Married by Sex, 1960-2003, United States
Year Males Females  
1960 88.0 87.4  
1970 89.3 86.9  
1980 84.2 81.4  
1990 74.1 73.0  
2000 69.0 71.6  
2003* 69.2 70.8 *
Source: US Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1961, Page 34, Table 27; Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1971, Page 32, Table 38; Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1981, Page 38, Table 49; and US Bureau of the Census, General Population Characteristics, 1990, Page 45, Table 34; and Statistical Abstract of the United States, 2001, Page 48, Table 51; internet tables (www.census.gov/population/socdemo/hh-fam/cps2002/tabA1-all.pdf) and data calculated from the Current Population Surveys, March 2003 Supplement.
*Figure for 2003 was obtained using data from the Current Population Surveys rather than data from the census. The CPS, March Supplement, is based on a sample of the US population, rather than an actual count such as those available from the decennial census. See sampling and weighting notes at http://www.bls.census.gov:80/cps/ads/2002/ssampwgt.htm

 


Figure 4. Percentage of Married Persons Age 18 and Older Who Said Their Marriages Were "Very Happy," by Period, United States
   
Period Men Women
1973-1976 69.6 68.6
1977-1981 68.3 64.2
1982-1986 62.9 61.7
1987-1991 66.4 59.6
1993-1996 63.2 59.7
1998-2002 64.6 60.3
Source: The General Social Survey, conducted by the National Opinion Research Center of the University of Chicago. The trend for both men and women is statistically significant (p <.01 on a two-tailed test.)

 


DIVORCE

Key Finding: The American divorce rate today is more than twice that of 1960, but has declined slightly since hitting the highest point in our history in the early 1980s. For the average couple marrying in recent years, the lifetime probability of divorce or separation remains close to 50 percent.

The increase in divorce, shown by the trend reported in Figure 5, probably has elicited more concern and discussion than any other family-related trend in the United States. Although the long-term trend in divorce has been upward since colonial times, the divorce rate was level for about two decades after World War II during the period of high fertility known as the baby boom. By the middle of the 1960s, however, the incidence of divorce started to increase and it more than doubled over the next fifteen years to reach an historical high point in the early 1980s. Since then the divorce rate has modestly declined, a trend described by many experts as "leveling off at a high level." The decline apparently represents a slight increase in marital stability.(1) Two probable reasons for this are an increase in the age at which people marry for the first time, and a higher educational level of those marrying, both of which are associated with greater marital stability. (2)

Although a majority of divorced persons eventually remarry, the growth of divorce has led to a steep increase in the percentage of all adults who are currently divorced (Figure 6). This percentage, which was only 1.8 percent for males and 2.6 percent for females in 1960, quadrupled by the year 2000. The percentage of divorced is higher for females than for males primarily because divorced men are more likely to remarry than divorced women. Also, among those who do remarry, men generally do so sooner than women.

Overall, the chances remain very high—still close to 50 percent—that a marriage started in recent years will end in either divorce or separation before one partner dies. (3) (But see the accompanying box: "Your Chances of Divorce May Be Much Lower Than You Think.") The likelihood of divorce has varied considerably among different segments of the American population, being higher for Blacks than for Whites, for instance, and higher in the West than in other parts of the country. But these variations have been diminishing. The trend toward a greater similarity of divorce rates between Whites and Blacks is largely attributable to the fact that fewer blacks are marrying. (4) Divorce rates in the South and Midwest have come to resemble those in the West, for reasons that are not well understood, leaving only the Eastern Seaboard and the Central Plains with significantly lower divorce.

At the same time, there has been little change in such traditionally large divorce rate differences as between those who marry when they are teenagers compared to those who marry after age 21, high-school drop outs versus college graduates, and the non-religious compared to the religiously committed. Teenagers, high-school drop outs, and the non-religious who marry have considerably higher divorce rates. (5)

1 Joshua R. Goldstein, "The Leveling of Divorce in the United States," Demography 36 (1999): 409-414

2 Tim B. Heaton, "Factors Contributing to Increased Marital Stability in the United States," Journal of Family Issues 23 (2002): 392-409

3 Robert Schoen and Nicola Standish, "The Retrenchment of Marriage: Results from Marital Status Life Tables for the United States, 1995," Population and Development Review 27-3 (2001): 553-563; R. Kelly Raley and Larry Bumpass, "The Topography of the Divorce Plateau: Levels and Trends in Union Stability in the United States after 1980," Demographic Research 8-8 (2003): 245-259

4 Jay D. Teachman, "Stability across Cohorts in Divorce Risk Factors," Demography 39-2 (2002): 331-351

5 Raley and Bumpass, 2003

BOX 2: YOUR CHANCES OF DIVORCE MAY BE MUCH LOWER THAN YOU THINK

By now almost everyone has heard that the national divorce rate is close to 50% of all marriages. This is true, but the rate must be interpreted with caution and several important caveats. For many people, the actual chances of divorce are far below 50/50.

The background characteristics of people entering a marriage have major implications for their risk of divorce. Here are some percentage point decreases in the risk of divorce or separation during the first ten years of marriage, according to various personal and social factors a:

Factors 

Percent Decrease

in Risk of Divorce

Annual income over $50,000 (vs. under $25,000)  -30
Having a baby seven months or more after marriage (vs. before marriage) -24
Marrying over 25 years of age (vs. under 18)  -24
Own family of origin intact (vs. divorced parents)  -14
Religious affiliation (vs. none)  -14
Some college (vs. high-school dropout)  -13

So if you are a reasonably well-educated person with a decent income, come from an intact family and are religious, and marry after age twenty five without having a baby first, your chances of divorce are very low indeed.

Also, it should be realized that the "close to 50%" divorce rate refers to the percentage of marriages entered into during a particular year that are projected to end in divorce or separation before one spouse dies. Such projections assume that the divorce and death rates occurring that year will continue indefinitely into the future—an assumption that is useful more as an indicator of the instability of marriages in the recent past than as a predictor of future events. In fact, the divorce rate has been dropping, slowly, since reaching a peak around 1980, and the rate could be lower (or higher) in the future than it is today.b

 

a Matthew D. Bramlett and William D. Mosher, Cohabitation, Marriage, Divorce and Remarriage in the United States, National Center for Health Statistics, Vital and Health Statistics, 23 (22), 2002. The risks are calculated for women only.

b Rose M. Kreider and Jason M. Fields, “Number, Timing and Duration of Marriages and Divorces, 1996,” Current Population Reports, P70-80, Washington, DC: US Census Bureau, 2002.

 

Figure 5. Number  of Divorces per 1,000 Married Women Age 15 and Older, by Year, United States
Year Divorces
1960 9.2
1965 10.6
1970 14.9
1975 20.3
1980 22.6
1985 21.7
1990 20.9
1995 19.8
2000 18.8

2002

18.4

We have used the number of divorces per 1,000 married women age 15 and older, rather than the Crude Divorce Rate of divorces per 1,000 population to help avoid the problem of compositional changes in the population. Even this more refined measure is somewhat susceptible to compositional changes.
Source: Statistical Abstract of the United States, 2001, Page 87, Table 117; National Vital Statistics Reports, August 22, 2001; California Current Population Survey Report: 2000, Table 3, March 2001; Statistical Abstract of the United States, 2002, Page 88, Table 111 and calculations by the National Marriage Project for the US less California, Indiana, Louisiana and Oklahoma using the Current Population Surveys, 2003.

 


Figure 6. Percentage of All Persons Age 15 and Older Who Were Divorced, by Sex and Race, 1960-2003 United States
Males Females
Year Total Blacks Whites Total Blacks Whites
1960 1.8 2 1.8 2.6 4.3 2.5
1970 2.2 3.1 2.1 3.5 4.4 3.4
1980 4.8 6.3 4.7 6.6 8.7 6.4
1990 6.8 8.1 6.8 8.9 11.2 8.6
2000 8.3 9.5 8.4 10.2 11.8 10.2

2003a

8.3 8.7 8.4 10.9 12.8 10.9
Source: U. S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Series P20-537; America's Families and Living Arrangements: March 2000 and earlier reports; and Current Population Surveys, March 2003 supplement, raw data.
a In 2003, the US Census Bureau expanded its racial categories to permit respondents to identify themselves as belonging to more than one race. This means that racial data computations begining in 2003 may not be strictly comparable to those of prior years.

UNMARRIED COHABITATION

Key Finding: The number of unmarried couples has increased dramatically over the past four decades, and the increase is continuing. Most younger Americans now spend some time living together outside of marriage, and unmarried cohabitation commonly precedes marriage.

Between 1960 and 2002, as indicated in Figure 7, the number of unmarried couples in America increased by over 1100 percent. Unmarried cohabitation—the status of couples who are sexual partners, not married to each other, and sharing a household—is particularly common among the young. It is estimated that about a quarter of unmarried women age 25 to 39 are currently living with a partner and an additional quarter have lived with a partner at some time in the past. Over half of all first marriages are now preceded by living together, compared to virtually none 50 years ago.(1)

For many, cohabitation is a prelude to marriage, for others, simply an alternative to living alone, and for a small but growing number, it is considered an alternative to marriage. Cohabitation is more common among those of lower educational and income levels. Recent data show that among women in the 19 to 44 age range, 60 percent of high school dropouts have cohabited compared to 37 percent of college graduates.(2) Cohabitation is also more common among those who are less religious than their peers, those who have been divorced, and those who have experienced parental divorce, fatherlessness, or high levels of marital discord during childhood. A growing percentage of cohabiting couple households, now almost 40 percent, contain children.

The belief that living together before marriage is a useful way "to find out whether you really get along," and thus avoid a bad marriage and an eventual divorce, is now widespread among young people. But the available data on the effects of cohabitation fail to confirm this belief. In fact, a substantial body of evidence indicates that those who live together before marriage are more likely to break up after marriage. This evidence is controversial, however, because it is difficult to distinguish the "selection effect" from the "experience of cohabitation effect." The selection effect refers to the fact that people who cohabit before marriage have different characteristics from those who do not, and it may be these characteristics, and not the experience of cohabitation, that leads to marital instability. There is some empirical support for both positions. Also, a recent study based on a nationally-representative sample of women concluded that premarital cohabitation (and premarital sex), when limited to a woman’s future husband, is not associated with an elevated risk of marital disruption.(3) What can be said for certain is that no evidence has yet been found that those who cohabit before marriage have stronger marriages than those who do not.(4)

1 Larry Bumpass and Hsien-Hen Lu, "Trends in Cohabitation and Implications for Children’s Family Contexts in the U. S.," Population Studies 54 (2000) 29-41

2 Bumpass and Lu, 2000.

3 Jay Teachman, "Premarital Sex, Premarital Cohabitation, and the Risk of Subsequent Marital Disruption among Women," Journal of Marriage and the Family 65 (2003): 444-455.

3 For a full review of the research on cohabitation see: Pamela J. Smock, "Cohabitation in the United States," Annual Review of Sociology 26 (2000); and David Popenoe and Barbara Dafoe Whitehead, Should We Live Together? What Young Adults Need to Know About Cohabitation Before Marriage—A Comprehensive Review of Recent Research, 2nd Edition (New Brunswick, NJ: The National Marriage Project, Rutgers University, 2002).

BOX 3: WHAT’S HAPPENING TO CHILD-REARING FAMILIES?

Scholars are now widely in agreement that the best family situation for children and adolescents is to live with married parents who have a good marriage. Unfortunately, the percentage of childrearing families with these characteristics has dropped dramatically in recent decades. In the 1973-1976 period, 51% of children under the age of eighteen were living with married adults in a marriage the reporting spouse rated as "very happy." By the 1997-2002 period, that percentage had dropped to 37%.a This negative change is the result of two trends: fewer children living in families headed by married couples, and a drop over time in the marital happiness of those couples (See Figures 11 and 4 in this report.)

Several reasons for this deterioration in children’s family situation are especially worrisome. One is that Americans increasingly view marriage and child rearing as separate pursuits. Take, for example, agreement among never-married young people ages 18-34 with the statement "those who want children should get married." In national surveys, 64% of the males in this category agreed in 1988, but only 51% did so in 2002. For females the drop was slightly steeper, from 56% to 42%.b Moreover, in our annual reporting of the family life opinions of American high school seniors, the greatest increase this year was in regard to the statement "having a child without being married is experimenting with a worthwhile lifestyle and not affecting anyone else." Fifty-six percent of senior boys now agree with this statement, up from 49% in the late 1990s and currently dead even with the percentage of senior girls who agree. (See Figure 17.)

A second reason for children’s deteriorating family situation is that children seem to be a growing impediment for the happiness of marriages. Many studies have shown that the arrival of the first baby commonly has the effect of pushing the mother and father apart, bringing stress to the marriage.c One recent review of over 100 research studies found that parents report significantly lower marital satisfaction than nonparents. This is especially true for parents of infants: Only 38% of mothers of infants have high marital satisfaction, compared to 62% of childless women. Further, this review concluded that the effect of parenthood on marital happiness is more negative among younger birth cohorts and higher socioeconomic groups, signs that the negative effect may be on the increase.d

 

a Calculation by Professor Norval Glenn, University of Texas, using data from the General Social Surveys conducted by the National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago.  Data are weighted by number of persons under age 18 in the household. The trends in pre-adults living with an unmarried person and in those living with married persons in a “very happy” marriage are statistically significant (p<.01 on a one-tailed test).

b General Social Surveys

c Carolyn Pape Cowan and Philip A. Cowan, When Partners Become Parents: The Big Life Change for Couples (New York: Basic Books, 1992); Jay Belsky and John Kelly, The Transition to Parenthood (New York: Dell, 1994).

d  Jean M Twenge, W. Keith Campbell and Craig A. Foster, “Parenthood and Marital Satisfaction: A Meta-Analytic Review,” Journal of Marriage and the Family 65 (August 2003): 574-583.


Figure 7. Number of Cohabiting, Unmarried, Adult Couples of the Opposite Sex, by Year, United States
 
Year Number
1960 0.439
1970 0.523
1980 1.589
1990 2.856
2000 4.736
2002 4.898

Source: U. S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Series P20-537; America's Families and Living Arrangements: March 2000; and Unmarried-Couple Households, by Presence of Children: 1960 to Present, Table UC-1, June 12, 2003 (www.census.gov/population/socdemo/hh-fam/tabUC-1.pdf) and earlier reports. 


LOSS OF CHILD CENTEREDNESS

Key Finding: The presence of children in America has declined significantly since 1960, as measured by fertility rates and the percentage of households with children. Other indicators suggest that this decline has reduced the child centeredness of our nation and contributed to the weakening of the institution of marriage.

Throughout history marriage has first and foremost been an institution for procreation and raising children. It has provided the cultural tie that seeks to hold the father to the mother-child bond. Yet in recent times, children increasingly have been pushed from center stage. (See accompanying box: What’s Happening to Child-Rearing Families?")

Americans on average have been having fewer children. Figure 8 indicates the decline in fertility since 1960. It is important to note that fertility had been gradually declining throughout American history, reaching a low point in the Great Depression of the 1930s before suddenly accelerating with the baby-boom generation starting in 1945. By 1960 the birth rate was back to where it had been in 1920, with the average woman having about three and one half children over the course of her life. Since 1960 the birth rate has mostly been down sharply, although it increased some in the 1980s and again in the late 1990s. Part of the recent upswing can be explained, in part, by a higher birth rate among new immigrants.

Since 2000 the birth rate has been continuing its downward trend. In 2002, the latest year for which we have complete information, the American "total fertility rate" (TFR) stood at 2.013, below the 1990 level and slightly above two children per woman. This rate is below the "replacement level" of 2.1, the level at which the population would be replaced through births alone, but is still one of the highest rates found in modern, industrialized societies. In most European and several Asian nations the total fertility rate has decreased to a level well below that of the United States, in some countries to only slightly more than one child per woman. (1) Many observers believe that the United States birthrate will decline further in future decades to become more like that of Europe today.

The long-term decline of births has had a marked effect on the household makeup of the American population. It is estimated that in the middle of the 1800s more than 75 percent of all households contained children under the age of 18. (2) One hundred years later, in 1960, this number had dropped to slightly less than half of all households. In 2000, just four decades later, less than 33 percent of households included children, and the percentage is projected to drop to 28 by 2010 (Figure 9). This obviously means that adults are less likely to be living with children, that neighborhoods are less likely to contain children, and that children are less likely to be a consideration in daily life. It suggests that the needs and concerns of children—especially young children—gradually may be receding from our national consciousness.

Several scholars determined that in 1960 the proportion of one’s life spent living with a spouse and children was 62 percent, the highest in our history. By that year the death rate had plummeted so that fewer marriages ended through death, and the divorce revolution of recent decades had not yet begun, so that a relatively small number of marriages ended in divorce. By 1985, however, just 25 years later, the proportion of one’s life spent with spouse and children dropped to 43 percent—which was the lowest in our history. (3) This remarkable reversal was caused mainly by the decline of fertility and the weakening of marriage through divorce and unwed births.

In a recent cross-national comparison of industrialized nations, the United States ranked virtually at the top in the percentage disagreeing with this statement: "the main purpose of marriage is having children."(4) Nearly 70 percent of Americans believe the main purpose of marriage is something else compared, for example, to just 51 percent of Norwegians or 45 percent of Italians. Consistent with this view is a dramatic change in our attitudes about holding marriages together for children. In a Detroit area sample of women, the proportion of women answering "no" to the question "Should a couple stay together for the sake of the children?" jumped from 51 percent to 82 percent between 1962 and 1985. (5) A nationally-representative 1994 sample found only 15 percent of the population agreeing that "When there are children in the family, parents should stay together even if they don’t get along." (6)

One effect of the weakening of child centeredness is clear. A careful analysis of divorce statistics shows that, beginning around 1975, the presence of children in a marriage has become only a very minor inhibitor of divorce (slightly more so when the child is male than female). (7)

1 The TFR in Spain, Italy and Greece is 1.2; in Germany, Japan and South Korea it is 1.3. World Population Data Sheet, (Washington DC: Population Reference Bureau, 2003).

2 James S. Coleman, Foundations of Social Theory (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1990): Figure 22.4, p. 588.

3 Susan Cotts Watkins, Jane A. Menken and John Bongaarts, "Demographic Foundations of Family Change," American Sociological Review 52 (1987): 346-358.

4 Tom W. Smith, "The Emerging 21st Century American Family," GSS Social Change Report 42, National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago, 1999: Table 20, 48.

5 Arland Thornton, "Changing Attitudes Toward Family Issues in the United States," Journal of Marriage and the Family 53 (1989): 873-893. This change occurred among women as they grew older, but it is very unlikely to be just an age effect.

6 The General Social Survey, conducted by the National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago.

7 Tim B. Heaton, "Marital Stability Throughout the Child-Rearing Years," Demography 27 (1990): 55-63; Philip Morgan, Diane Lye, and Gretchen Condran, "Sons, Daughters, and the Risk of Marital Disruption" American Journal of Sociology 94 (1988): 110-129; Linda Waite and Lee A. Lillard, "Children and Marital Disruption," American Journal of Sociology 96 (1991): 930-953.


Figure 8. Fertility Rates, 1960-2002, Number of Births per 1,000 Women Age 15 through 44, United States
     
Year General Fertility Rate Total Fertility Rate
1960 118.0 3.654  
1970 87.9 2.480  
1980 68.4 1.840  
1990 70.9 2.081  
2000 65.9 2.056  
2002 64.8 2.013  
a The number of births that an average woman would have if, at each year of age, she experienced the birth rates occurring in the specified year. A total fertility rate of 2,110 represents "replacement level" fertility under current mortality conditions (assuming no net migration).
Source: National Vital Statistics Report, 1993, Pages 1, 2, 10 and 11; National Vital Statistics Report, 2001, 49:1; and US Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1999, Pages 75, 76 and 78, Tables 91, 93 and 96. Ventura, S., et al. Revised Birth and Fertility Rates for the United States, 2000 and 2001, National Vital Statistics Report, 51:4, Feb 6, 2003, p. 2 and 4, and National Vital Statistics Reports, 52:10, December 17, 2003, p. 2 and 6.
Total Fertility Ratea
1960 3.654
1970 2.480
1980 1.840
1990 2.081
2000 2.130
2002 2.013

Figure 9. Percentage of Households with a Child or Children Under Age 18, 1960-2010, United States
 
Year Percent
1960 48.7
1970 42.2
1980 38.4
1990 34.6
2000 32.8
2010 projected 28.0
Source: Calculated from data in US Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1976, Page 40, Table 53; Page 42, Table 56; Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1981, Page 46, Tables 66 and 67; and Statistical Abstract of the United States, 2001, Page 50, Table 56; Projections of the Number of Households and Families in the United States: 1995 to 2010, Current Population Reports, Series P25-1129

 


Figure 10. Percentage of Children Under Age 18 Living with A Single Parent, by Year and Race, United States